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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On the morning of trial, Bennett Jacob Bartlett pled guilty to aggravated assault 
and was sentenced that same day by a plan B judge to 5 years with the first 2 years 
fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. The court directly told Mr. Bartlett that if he 
successfully completed his rider, he would be placed on probation. Mr. Bartlett was not 
advised that he could successfully complete his rider but nevertheless not be placed on 
probation. Mr. Bartlett successfully completed his rider and received a recommendation 
of probation, but a different judge (the original presiding judge rather than the plan B 
judge) instead relinquished jurisdiction. 1 
Mr. Bartlett appealed and before his Appellant's brief was filed, the briefing 
schedule was suspended and a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence was filed 
in the district court. The presiding judge ultimately denied relief, holding that the plan 
B judge's promise of probation if Mr. Bartlett successfully completed his rider was not 
actually a promise but merely a pep talk. Also, the presiding judge held that even 
though Mr. Bartlett completed all programming on his rider, had no formal or informal 
disciplinary sanctions, and received a recommendation of probation, this did not 
constitute a successful rider and so he was not entitled to have any promise honored 
anyway. 
1 In an effort to make clear which judge did what, the originally assigned judge who 
presided over every part of this case (except for the change of plea and sentencing) 
including the rider review hearing and the Rule 35 motion, will be referred to as the 
'presiding judge,' and the other judge who presided over the change of plea and 
sentencing will be referred to as the 'plan B' judge. 
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The briefing schedule has now been reinstated, and Appellant asserts that the 
presiding judge erred, first by relinquishing jurisdiction and second by failing to correct 
the error pursuant to the Rule 35 motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The official version of the offense is as provided in the PSI: 
The appended Boise Police Reports reflect that on March 9, 2010, officers 
responded to the home of Sharyl Wilson after she reported that her friend, 
Bennett Bartlett, had physically assaulted her. 
Upon arrival, Ms. Wilson told officers that when Mr. Bartlett was under the 
inflyence of alcohol, he picked up her Shihtzu dog by the neck and 
punched it twice. When she attempted to intervene, Mr. Bartlett began 
shoving her and held his hand over her mouth until she could not breathe. 
Ms. Wilson said that Mr. Bartlett then reportedly threatened to "put his first 
down my throat" and threatened to put a sock and plastic bag in her mouth 
to prevent her from making any noise. Ms. Wilson relayed that Mr. Bartlett 
pulled her by her hair down the hallway and hit her multiple times in the 
face. 
Ms. Wilson stated that Mr. Bartlett would not allow her to leave her 
apartment for nearly two (2) hours. Ms. Wilson indicated that Mr. Bartlett 
forced her to lay face down on the couch and said when she attempted to 
get up, he hit her with the blade of his hand. 
At one point, Ms. Wilson said that Mr. Bartlett needed to use the restroom 
but was afraid to leave her alone so urinated in a glass and empty beer 
can. Eventually, Ms. Wilson relayed that she convinced Mr. Bartlett to 
leave her home and promised not to call the police. Mr. Bartlett threatened 
that if she called the "pigs" that he would "get you later." 
Officers located Mr. Bartlett near the intersection of 35th and State Street, 
at which time he was arrested for Kidnapping and Cruelty to Animals. Prior 
to speaking with Mr. Bartlett, he was taken to Saint Alphonsus Hospital to 
be medically cleared due to his level of intoxication. 
PSI, p. 2. 
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Mr. Bartlett was charged by complaint, and then an Information after a 
preliminary hearing, with second degree kidnapping and cruelty to animals. (R. p. 7-8, 
21, 26-27.) 
Mr. Bartlett entered into a written I.C.R. 11 plea agreement whereby the parties 
stipulated that an amended information would be filed charging only aggravated 
assault, to which he would plead guilty. (R. p. 62-63.) Material terms included that he 
would be sentenced to 5 years with 2 years fixed and that Mr. Bartlett would be placed 
on probation, and he would receive credit for time served prior to sentencing and the 
state would not seek additional incarceration. (R. p. 63) The agreement recited that 
the parties have entered into lengthy discussions and are of the joint opinion that said 
disposition is in the interests of justice. (R. p. 63.) The presiding judge (Judge 
Copsey), accepted the plea agreement. (R. p. 61.) 
At the time of sentencing, the presiding judge advised Mr. Bartlett that she was 
not inclined to follow the Rule 11 plea agreement, and Mr. Bartlett withdrew his guilty 
plea and the matter was set for trial. (R. p. 76-77.) The presiding judge was concerned 
about his criminal history and need for treatment for alcohol. (Tr. 8/4/2010, p. 34-35.) 
A plan B judge was assigned to preside over the trial (Senior Judge Peter 
McDermott). (R. p. 81.) On the morning of trial, the parties entered into a plea 
agreement whereby Mr. Bartlett would plead guilty to aggravated assault and the state 
would recommend that the court retain jurisdiction. (Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 1.) 
The plan B judge directly advised Mr. Bartlett that if he successfully completed 
his rider he would be placed on probation, which will be discussed in detail below. Mr. 
Bartlett was never advised that he could successfully complete his rider but 
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nevertheless not received probation. The plan B judge proceeded with the guilty plea 
colloquy and accepted the plea of guilty, which he described as kind of an oral Rule 11. 
(Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 5-9.) 
With the consent of counsel and Mr. Bartlett, the plan B judge proceeded to 
sentencing that same day. (Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 9.) The plan B judge imposed a sentence 
of 5 years with the first 2 fixed and retained jurisdiction and sent Mr. Bartlett on a rider. 
(R. p. 87-89, 91.) 
Mr. Bartlett successfully completed his rider, completing all classes and having 
no formal or information disciplinary sanctions, and the district court received an 
addendum to the PSI which recommended the court place Mr. Bartlett on probation. 
(PSI, p. 181.) 
Back in court for the rider review, the presiding judge declined to follow the 
recommendation and relinquished jurisdiction. (R. p. 97.) 
Mr. Bartlett timely appealed. (R. p. 105.) 
During the pendency of the appeal, the briefing schedule was suspended and Mr. 
Bartlett filed a Rule 35 motion to correct illegal sentence and memorandum in support. 
Mr. Bartlett requested that the presiding judge suspend his sentence and place him on 
probation as a remedy. The state filed an opposition. The presiding judge ultimately 
denied the Rule 35 motion in a written decision? 
2 Appellant has requested that the Rule 35 Motion and Order Denying Rule 35 Motion 
be augmented to the record pursuant to the contemporaneously filed motion to 
augment. Appellant is not at this time requesting that the briefing from below be 
augmented since his argument in his memorandum in support is substantially identical 
to that in this brief and the responses in the State's Objection are also addressed in 
the Order denying the Rule 35 motion. 
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ISSUES 
I. 
WHETHER THE PRESIDING JUDGE ERRED WHEN SHE RELINQUISHED 
JURISDICTION AFTER MR. BARTLETT SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED HIS RIDER, 
CONTRARY TO THE PROMISE OF PROBATION MADE BY THE PLAN B JUDGE 
WHO SENTENCED HIM 
II. 
WHETHER THE PRESIDING JUDGE ERRED WHEN SHE FAILED TO CORRECT 
THE ERROR PURSUANT TO THE RULE 35 MOTION 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Presiding Judge Erred When She Relinquished Jurisdiction After Mr. Bartlett 
Successfully Completed His Rider, Contrary To The Promise of Probation Made 
By the Plan B Judge Who Sentenced Him 
1) Introduction 
Appellant asserts that the presiding judge erred by relinquishing jurisdiction after 
Mr. Bartlett successfully completed his rider, contrary to the promise of the plan B judge. 
Under Issue I, Appellant will set forth the argument as to why Mr. Bartlett was entitled to 
have the promise honored, which was also presented to the district court 
Further, Appellant assert that the presiding judge erred when she failed to correct 
the error pursuant to the Rule 35 motion. Appellant will explain that ruling and why it was 
erroneous under Issue II, below. 
2) The hearings 
As mentioned above, at the change of plea hearing and the initial sentencing, the 
plan B judge directly and repeatedly advised Mr. Bartlett that he would be placed on 
probation if he successfully completed his rider. The first time it happened was at the 
beginning of the change of plea hearing. The following recitation is the entire explanation 
of the agreement to the defendant by the court: 
THE COURT: Okay. Now sir, the discussion between counsel and-you 
know, I want to be fair with you. I read your presentence report. And it 
appears to the Court that you definitely need substance abuse treatment 
and anger management counseling so you can be a good member of this 
society and not get in any trouble. 
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And I told your attorney that if you did enter a plea of guilty to the felony, 
aggravated assault, I would have no problem imposing the sentence they 
recommend and retaining jurisdiction for up to 180 days. 
And that would mean that you WOUld, more than likely, go up to 
Cottonwood, Idaho. It would be up to the department of corrections where 
you'd go. But you'd go up to the department of corrections, and I would 
recommend you be placed in the substance abuse program. And if you 
complete that program successfully, they would then file a 
recommendation to the Court that you be brought back and placed on 
probation. And then you could get on with our life. 
And then at the end of the-if you complete your probation successfully, 
the-- and didn't have any problems on probation, your attorney can file a 
motion to reduce this charge to a misdemeanor. So you wouldn't be a 
convicted felon. 
THE DEFENDANT: And that is at the end of five years? 
THE COURT: Yeah. That would be at the end of your probation. 
THE DEFENDANT: Which would be five years? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] Normally, five years. In this case it would be a 
five-year probation. 
THE COURT: So-
THE DEFENDANT: And then it wouldn't go on my record as a felony 
then? 
THE COURT: No, it would be on your record. Because in Idaho we don't 
have a way to expunge and release everything. But it would show you 
pled guilty to aggravated assault, you went on a retained jurisdiction. And 
if you completed that successfully, then it would show you were placed on 
probation. And if you competed that successfully, then it would show that 
the charge is reduced to a misdemeanor, like assault, see? 
So when you are filling out forms later on down the road after this 
happened, "have you ever been convicted of a felony?" you could say no, 
after it's been reduced to a misdemeanor. 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Actually, to clarity that for the record, he did have 
a prior felony conviction or two out of Washington. 
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THE COURT: Oh, he did? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah so he could not answer "no." 
THE COURT: Okay. So the Court then, with the concurrence of counsel, 
will agree to amend the Information that was filed June 30, 2010, can be 
deemed filed today. Also, sir, would you like to enter a plea to felony 
aggravated assault today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Yes. 
THE COURT: What is your plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty 
THE COURT: I will accept your plea and I ask you some questions. 
Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 2, Ins. 14-p. 5, In. 1 (emphasis added). 
Clearly, Mr. Bartlett was not advised of the possibility of him successfully 
completing the rider but nevertheless not being placed on probation. Further, as will be 
discussed below, more explanations to him occurring in proceedings later that day did 
nothing to disabuse him of the notion that if he successfully completed his rider he 
would necessarily be placed on probation. 
The court proceeded with the guilty plea colloquy and accepted the plea of guilty, 
which it described as kind of an oral Rule 11. (Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 5-9.) Everyone was in 
agreement that they could just immediately proceed to sentencing, but the prosecutor 
wanted the victim to be able to be present, so the matter was set over until the 
afternoon. 
After the recess, the court confirmed Mr. Bartlett's answers on the guilty plea 
advisory that had originally been filed along with the original Rule 11 plea agreement 
that the presiding judge had earlier rejected. The court confirmed to Mr. Bartlett that 
the maximum sentence he could receive was 5 years but again, did not discuss in any 
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way that it was really up to the rider review judge whether he would be placed on 
probation or not. (Tr. 9/27/2011, p. 14.) 
Then at the sentencing, when it came time for the recommendations, the 
prosecutor stated: 
Judge, I think given the facts of this case, this is a fair resolution. We'd ask 
that you follow the resolution. We'd ask that you follow the resolution here; 
that you go ahead and impose a rider in this case. 
At the time of when he comes back from the rider, the State will at that 
point be asking for additional terms of the sentence. But I think for today's 
purposes, if you follow the plea agreement and impose the two plus three 
for five years and retain jurisdiction, for today's purposes, the State would 
be satisfied with that. 
Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 17, Ins. 6-16. 
During his allocution, Mr. Bartlett apologized to the victim, and the court 
confirmed she was in agreement with the sentence. (Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 16, 18.) The 
court then asked Mr. Bartlett whether he had anything else he would like to say, to 
which Mr. Bartlett responded: 
No. I didn't understand the additional things that are going to be imposed 
on or asked for after the-when I get back from the rider. I thought it would 
be just probation right then. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess if the prosecutor wants to make some 
recommendations to the Judge, it doesn't necessarily mean that she'll 
follow it, you know. 
[PROSECUTOR] Judge, I can inform the Court and the defense that 
those-some of those terms-if he earns probation, some of those terms 
may be no contact order, may be public defender reimbursement, may be 
other statutorily permitted sentencing terms at that point, but I just want to 
wait and see what happens at the rider review. 
THE COURT: Okay, and you understand like, even if your complete the 
retain jurisdiction program successfully and you are placed on probation, 
some of the terms of probation could be that you could be ordered to 
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reimburse the District Court, reimburse the Public Defender, stuff like that, 
Okay? They will give you time to pay it. 
THE DEFENDANT: I was informed in the last-to go along with the last 
thing the conditions of the last one. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
THE DEFENDANT: I thought that that was waived, some of that was. I 
don't know. I thought that was part of the agreement, because I'm poor. 
I'm not going to be able to afford that. 
THE COURT: If it was waived last time, it's not waived this time. But 
whatever would be imposed, it would be a condition of your probation. And 
nobody gets put in jail because you can't pay, okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: And so they would give you-they would set you up with 
payments that you could make, okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: All right. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, sir. Then-and you do, again, waive your 
time for sentencing. You want to go ahead and get sentenced today, right 
now? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. And is that okay with you, [defense counsel]? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: [Prosecutor], is that okay with you? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Your Honor. 
Tr. 9/27/2020, p. 18, In. 25-p. 20, In. 20 (emphasis added). 
Significantly, even though Mr. Bartlett took it upon himself to clarify what could 
happen to him after he completed his rider, still no one told him he could successfully 
complete it and nevertheless go to prison. At worst, based on the above, he would have 
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believed that he might have to pay some money or be subject to a no-contact order 
imposed. 
The court then discussed the sentencing factors and imposed a sentence of five 
years with the first two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 20-21.) 
The court proceeded to discuss Mr. Bartlett's credit for time served, explaining what it 
would be if, for example, he didn't make it on his rider. (Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 21-22.) The 
court continued in its explanation: 
Okay. So under Idaho law, after you served the two year fixed sentence, 
you'd be eligible for parole. And it would be up to the parole commission 
when you could be released. But in no event could they hold you any 
longer than the total of five years, see? You understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: That if I fouled up on the-
THE COURT: Right. 
THE DEFENDANT: But if I complete the program and everything goes 
good, I will be on probation? 
THE COURT: Right. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understand that. 
Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 23, Ins. 4-15 (emphasis added). 
The court then gave Mr. Bartlett some friendly advice about the right attitude to 
have on the rider and the kind of people to stay away from. The court continued: 
And so when you come back here, Judge Copsey is going to see every 
item you violated a rule. And if you violate a lot of rules up there, she's 
going to say to herself, I don't think he can do probation successfully 
because he violated all these rules up there, and he's not going to follow 
our rules of probation. See, that's how it works. 
THE DEFENANT: Weill am confident that I'll come back with a A-1 report. 
THE COURT: Okay. Hope you do. 
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Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 24, In. 20-p. 25, In. 4. 
So again, it was never explained to Mr. Bartlett that he could successfully 
complete his rider but not be placed on probation. In fact, the last comments of the 
court implied that he could do somewhat poorly and nevertheless still be placed on 
probation. At most, he was advised here that if he violated rules the presiding judge 
could then decide whether to place him on probation, but he was never advised the 
judge could make the same determination if was violation free (which he was). 
As mentioned above, the APSI recommended that the court place Mr. Bartlett on 
probation. (PSI p. 175, 181.) Significantly, at the rider review hearing, defense counsel 
had changed. Therefore, since the original judge was again presiding, the only person 
who had been at the change of plea hearing and initial sentencing and knew about the 
plan B judge's promise was the prosecutor. But the prosecutor, for whatever reason, 
failed to advise the court about the plan B judge's promise and instead recommended 
that the sentence be imposed to the therapeutic community. (Tr. 1/19/2011, p. 9-10.) 
Defense counsel, who again, had not been at the change of plea hearing or initial 
sentencing, acknowledged the state's and court's frustration with the CAPP program, 
but pointed out that Mr. Bartlett asked to be placed on a traditional rider but was refused 
by IDOC, and so it was out of his control and he did the only thing that was available to 
him. (Tr. 1/19/2011, p. 10-12.) 
After reviewing the case and Mr. Bartlett's criminal history, the presiding judge 
ruled as follows: 
This is a very-and I remember at the time because the original 
agreement was for probation and I told the parties at the time there was 
no way, no way that I could follow this agreement and we were going to go 
to trial. 
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Ultimately a Plan B judge came in or a senior judge came in and he was 
able to work out a resolution which included a recommendation of a 
retained jurisdiction. 
Now, the CAPP recommendation-the CAPP case does not give me any 
kind of solace, and I'll tell you why. Because all the way through this, what 
they say is you appear confused and have difficulty really understanding 
what it is that you did. They also indicate they do not have the facilities to 
treat any mental health issues. 
I'm not comfortable placing you on probation. In my opinion you are an 
extreme danger to the community. I don't believe that this has addressed 
the issues that need to be addressed. And even by their own 
recommendation they are suggesting that you suffer from issues that 
simply cannot be addressed at CAPPo 
So what I'm going to do in this case is I am declining to exercise the 
retained jurisdiction. You are remanded to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Corrections for execution of the judgment. I have si~ned a no-
contact order which is absolute that will run through January 19t , 2016. 
In addition to that, I am imposing court costs, I am imposing public 
defender reimbursement of $250, a fine of $1,000 and restitution in the 
amount of $400. 
Tr. 1/19/2011, p. 17, In. 11-p. 18, In. 19. 
3) The presiding judge erred by relinquishing jurisdiction instead of honoring the plan 
B judge's promise to put Mr. Bartlett on probation if he successfully completed his rider. 
Appellant is unaware of any published Idaho caselaw addressing this exact 
situation, to wit, where one judge makes a promise, the defendant performs, but then a 
different judge does not honor that promise. Thus, the exact error involved defies easy 
characterization, but is nevertheless a clear injustice which must be remedied. 
To begin with, the normal standards used for relinquishment of jurisdiction review 
do not apply. This is not a situation where the court had discretion to relinquish 
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jurisdiction or not, rather, in our case, the court did not have the discretion to relinquish 
jurisdiction after the defendant performed.3 
Our situation is similar, but not exactly the same, as State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 
506 (Ct. App. 1995). There, the court accepted a plea agreement which stipulated a 
maximum three year sentence with the first year fixed. At the initial sentencing the court 
did not impose the maximum available sentence, but instead granted a withheld 
judgment and placed the defendant on probation. Later, after the defendant violated his 
probation, the court revoked it and imposed a five year sentence with the first 2 % years 
fixed. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held this was an illegal sentence because the court 
did not advise the defendant it was rejecting the plea agreement nor gave him a 
chance to withdraw his guilty plea, and so was limited to the sentence provided for in 
the binding plea agreement. 
While Appellant likewise asserts the instant sentence is similarly illegal, he 
acknowledges the imperfection of that analogy because here, the sentencing court 
followed the plea agreement and retained jurisdiction, it was the rider review court which 
did not follow the sentencing court's promise of probation. Nevertheless, in the 
3 Despite the presiding judge's complaints that Mr. Bartlett seemed confused and the 
CAPP program could not address his mental illness, it cannot be seriously argued that 
he did not successfully complete his rider since the APSI and C-notes show that he 
completed his classes, had no formal or informal disciplinary sanctions, and received a 
recommendation of probation. 
Further, the court's complaint about the unaddressed mental illness was simply based 
on CAPP's statement that "[h]e has stated he has ongoing depression that may need 
additional consideration during recovery. This type of treatment is not available at 
CAPP." PSI, p. 181. Also, while he did present as confused, the remainder of that 
sentence states that "yet has been compliant and has begun to show an eagerness to 
gain insight and participate." (R. p. 181.) 
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parlance of Wilson, the rider review court erred when it did not give Mr. Bartlett the 
opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty because it would not be following the 
sentencing court's promise of certain probation if he performed. 
Alternatively, the error can be characterized as the plea not being voluntarily, 
knowing and intelligently made in violation of both constitutional due process standards 
(5th and 14th Amendments) as well as I.C.R. 11, since Mr. Bartlett was not advised by 
the change of plea court that the rider review court could relinquish jurisdiction despite 
his successful rider. 
But Appellant asserts that the best way to view the error in this case is as the 
Ninth Circuit did in similar situation which while not controlling, is an interesting analogy 
to ours. In United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1995), the defendant 
waived his right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement, so long as the sentence 
was within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range. Despite the waiver clause in 
Buchanan's plea agreement, the district court judge explicitly informed Buchanan during 
his sentencing hearing that he had a right to appeal his sentence within ten days. 
Buchanan indicated that he understood the judge's statements. Furthermore the 
government did not object to the district court's erroneous statements regarding 
Buchanan's right to appeal. 
The Ninth Circuit held that because of the court's statements, Buchanan could 
have a reasonable expectation that he could appeal his sentence . 
. . . here, the oral pronouncement must control. The district court twice 
stated that Buchanan had a right to appeal his sentence. Indeed, 
Buchanan's answer of "Yes, sir" to the district court's question of whether 
he understood that he had a right to appeal indicates Buchanan's 
expectation that he could appeal his sentence and evinces a 
misunderstanding of the substance of his plea agreement. We note also 
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that the government did not object to the district court's erroneous 
statements. Thus, Buchanan could have no reason but to believe that the 
court's advice on the right to appeal was correct. 
Litigants need to be able to trust the oral pronouncements of district court 
judges. Given the district court judge's clear statements at sentencing, the 
defendant's assertion of understanding, and the prosecution's failure to 
object, we hold that in these circumstances, the district court's oral 
pronouncement controls and the plea agreement waiver is not 
enforceable. 
Id. at p. 918 (emphasis added). 
So according to Buchanan, it does not matter that the district court was wrong in 
its advice, a litigant gets to rely on what he is told by the court. In our case, one judge 
clearly and repeatedly advised Mr. Bartlett that if he successfully completed his rider, 
that he would be placed on probation. Mr. Bartlett's questions to the judge which 
confirmed this indisputably evinces it was Mr. Bartlett's understanding. Further, the 
state did not object or correct the court by explaining that even with a successful rider 
he could still have jurisdiction relinquished. Rather, the state only talked about additional 
conditions of the sentence in terms of monetary reimbursement and a no contact order. 
While the state mentioned that probation must be earned, there was nothing about that 
comment that would alert Mr. Bartlett that it meant anything other than he must 
successfully complete his rider. In short, Mr. Bartlett could have no reason to not believe 
that the court's description of what would happen was correct. 
Appellant asserts that in the Idaho state courts as well as the federal courts, 
litigants must be able to trust the oral pronouncements of judges. In other words, 
Appellant asserts that in order to maintain the integrity of the justice system, here, the 
promise of one judge must be followed by another judge, particularly where the 
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defendant relies on the promise to his detriment by pleading guilty and then performs 
his side of the bargain by successfully completing his rider. 
While it can certainly be argued that a rider is for evaluative purposes and so the 
sentencing judge should not have made a promise of probation for a successful rider, 
that judge nevertheless did so. Regardless of whether the promise should have been 
made or not, it was in fact made, and Mr. Bartlett was led down the garden path by 
it. 
To conclude, regardless of how the error is characterized, an error occurred 
which must be remedied at the very least for equitable reasons, to correct injustice and 
maintain judicial integrity. 
II. 
The Presiding Judge Erred When She Failed To Correct The Error Pursuant 
To The Rule 35 Motion 
1) The Order Denying Rule 35 Motion 
While the presiding judge did not know of the plan B judge's promise or have the 
transcripts at the time of the rider review hearing, she certainly did when the Rule 35 
motion was filed, but nevertheless denied relief. In short, the presiding judge rejected 
the arguments made in Issue I, above, by concluding that there was no promise by the 
plan B judge, but only a pep talk. Further, the presiding judge held Mr. Bartlett did not 
have a successful rider and so was not entitled to have any promise honored anyway. 
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To further explain, the presiding judge's Order Denying Rule 35 Motion 
(hereinafter Order) held that the motion failed for several reason.4 
First, the Order recited the plea agreement put on the record: 
Your Honor, at this point the State has agreed to, I guess, amend the 
Information to charge only an aggravated assault. Upon a plea of guilty, 
the State would recommend an underlying sentence of two plus three, a 
period of retain jurisdiction. And I'm not sure there were any other terms, 
except, I think, the State would object to any sort of transfer to-transfer 
of probation to Washington, although ultimately that's up to the 
department of correction. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, we'd ask for a five year no contact order. But 
that's pretty standard. 
Order, p. 3-4. 
The Order pointed out there was nothing in the plea agreement that included a 
promise of probation after the retained jurisdiction.5 
The Order explained that Mr. Bartlett was not relying on the express promise 
being in the plea agreement, but instead, relying on Buchanan, supra, Mr. Bartlett was 
contending that the plan B judge's extensive discussion with him created an 
expectation that he would be placed on probation if he did well on his retained 
jurisdiction. However, the Order held that the plan B judge's comments did not create 
4 Despite being grammatically awkward, when discussing the rulings the term "Order" 
will be used rather than the court or the presiding judge, to avoid any confusion about 
when the presiding judge was doing something. 
5 However, the Order failed to acknowledge the transcript makes it clear there were 
negotiations with the plan B judge (and the plan B judge refers to the negotiations) that 
were off the record. Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 1, Ins. 10-11. At the very least the plan B judge 
agreed to impose the recommended sentence and send Mr. Bartlett on a rider if he 
pled guilty and referred to it as a kind of oral Rule 11. Id., p. 2, Ins. 20-23; p. 9. Ins. 5-6. 
This promise was not mentioned in the abbreviated recitation of the plea agreement 
placed on the record. 
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an expectation of probation and he was not promised probation. "[C]onsidering the 
totality of [the plan B judge's] comments, both at the entry of plea and at sentencing, 
[the plan B judge] did not 'promise' Bartlett probation even if he had done a 'good' 
retained jurisdiction." Order, p. 13. 
The Order explained that the law is clear that a court's decision in reviewing a 
defendant's retained jurisdiction is a matter of discretion; a party does not earn 
probation. Further, it is the court's responsibility to determine if a defendant presents an 
appropriate risk for probation and the court is to consider more than simply performance 
at the retained jurisdiction. (Order, p. 14.) 
The Order then discussed Buchanan: 
Buchanan is of limited application; the Ninth Circuit stands alone in 
holding that a court's oral reference to the right to appeal trumps a 
defendant's waiver of that right in a plea agreement. The defendant in 
Buchannan had a right to appeal and as part of his plea agreement, he 
had negotiated away that right. The court's comments were interpreted to 
have reinstated that pre-existing right. However, following Buchanan, the 
Ninth Circuit clarified its position in United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202 
(9th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Lopez-Armenta, 400 F .3d 1173 (9th 
Cir.2005); see also, State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,498, 129 P.3d 1241, 
1247 (2006). In Lopez, the defendant entered an unconditional plea of 
guilty waiving his right to appeal pretrial constitutional defects. Later at the 
sentencing hearing, when the district court informed Lopez that he had a 
right to appeal, Lopez tried to use Buchanan to argue that the court's on-
the-record statement informing him that he had a right to appeal trumped 
his guilty plea waiving that same right. The Ninth Circuit did not accept 
Lopez's argument, and explained exactly how Buchanan is to be used: 
Buchanan addresses the situation in which confusion regarding 
appellate rights arises contemporaneously with the waiver, while 
Floyd applies where the defendant attempts to have later 
confusion "relate back" to his waiver. Accordingly, we hold that 
Lopez knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the 
suppression ruling, and his waiver was not affected by the district 
court's ambiguous statement three months later at the sentencing 
hearing. 
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Lopez-Armenta, 400 F.3d at 1177 (cited [sic] State v. Cope, 142 Idaho at 
498-99, 129 P.3d at 1247-48). 
Order, p. 14. 
The Order then explained that the primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction 
program is to provide more information to the trial court regarding the defendant's 
potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation and there is no inherent right to 
probation even if it was a good retained jurisdiction. (Order, p. 15.) 
"Thus, even if Buchanan applied, unless [the plan B judge's] comments 
clearly and unambiguously guaranteed probation based solely on a 
probation recommendation from the jurisdictional review committee, 
Bartlett may not rely on any alleged promise. Reading the plan B judge's 
discussions with Bartlett as a whole, it is clear that [the plan B Judge] is 
simply gave [sic] Bartlett a "pep talk" to encourage him to do well and 
meaningful engage in the treatment available to him on a retained 
jurisdiction. [The plan B Judge] did not promise probation. According to 
Bartlett's trial counsel's recitation of the plea agreement, there was no 
probation promise from the State. 
Moreover, a careful review of the entire colloquy reveals that the [plan B 
judge] clearly advised Bartlett that the Presiding Judge would be making 
a decision at the end of the retained jurisdiction about whether he would 
do well on probation. [The plan B judge] also advised him that his attitude 
would make a difference. While he used the term "successful rider," [the 
plan B judge] did not define what constituted a "successful" rider and did 
not guarantee that the Presiding Judge would place him on probation if 
the Department of Corrections "recommended" probation following his 
rider. Instead, [the plan B judge] clearly informed Bartlett that the presiding 
judge would make the decision. 
Order, p. 15-16 (footnote omitted). 
The Order then explained that the plan B judge used words like 
"recommendation" to describe the Department of Corrections report to the court, and a 
recommendation is by definition advisory. (Order, p. 16.) The Order then repeated Mr. 
Bartlett's comments to the CAPP staff made on December 14, 2010, just before he 
returned to court for his disposition: "He is concerned that no matter how hard he tries, 
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his judge will not accept his program an extend him anyway." Order p. 16-17. The 
Order concluded that Mr. Bartlett's comments demonstrate that even he did not believe 
he had any promise of probation from the plan B Judge. (Order, p. 16-17.) 
Second, the Order held that Mr. "Bartlett's retained jurisdiction clearly was not 
successful." Order, p. 17. The Order explained that Mr. Bartlett did not get the 
treatment for his history of violence and mental health issues anticipated by the plan B 
judge because he was not sent to Cottonwood for a traditional rider. 
Instead, the Department of Corrections placed him in a new, cheaper, 
program, where Bartlett did not get any counseling or anger management. 
He only received drug and alcohol treatment. The Court must take that 
into account when deciding whether to place Bartlett on probation. 
Order, p. 17 (emphasis in the original). 
The Order also explained that even as to the treatment and programming he did 
receive, while he got a recommendation of probation, plainly he did not fully assimilate 
the substance abuse treatment and that made the presiding judge uncomfortable about 
placing Mr. Bartlett on probation. (Order, p. 17.) 
Accordingly, at disposition, the Court was faced with an individual who did 
not receive treatment to address significant mental health issues or 
anger and violent tendencies and for whom the treatment he did receive 
was likely not very effective. This was not a "successful" retained 
jurisdiction and the Court correctly relinquished. 
Order, p. 18. 
2) The presiding judge erred by denying the Rule 35 Motion 
To summarize, the Order erroneously denied the Rule 35 motion because 
contrary to its holdings: 1) there was a promise; 2) Mr. Bartlett was not advised that if 
he successful completed his rider there would still be a later decision made by the 
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presiding judge to determine if he would be placed on probation; 3) completing all 
classes, having no formal or informal disciplinary sanctions, and receiving a 
recommendation of probation constitutes a successful rider for the purposes of the plan 
B judge's bargain; and 4) factors outside of Mr. Bartlett's control (to wit, the rider 
placement made by the Department of Corrections) are not appropriate considerations 
in determining whether he performed. 
Regarding the closely related issues of whether there was promise and whether 
Mr. Bartlett was informed that the presiding judge would be making a decision about 
whether he would be placed on probation or not at his rider review hearing, given the 
Order's conclusory treatment, the relevant exchanges will be recited once more. First, 
Mr. Bartlett was told the following by the plan B judge at the change of plea hearing: 
And that would mean that you would, more than likely, go up to 
Cottonwood, Idaho. It would be up to the department of corrections where 
you'd go. But you'd go up to the department of corrections, and I would 
recommend you be placed in the substance abuse program. And if you 
complete that program successfully. they would then file a 
recommendation to the Court that you be brought back and placed on 
probation. And then you could get on with our life. 
THE COURT: No, it would be on your record. Because in Idaho we don't 
have a way to expunge and release everything. But it would show you 
pled guilty to aggravated assault, you went on a retained jurisdiction. And 
if you completed that successfully. then it would show you were placed on 
probation. And if you competed that successfully, then it would show that 
the charge is reduced to a misdemeanor, like assault, see? 
Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 2, In. 24-p. 4, In. 5 (emphasis added). 
In light of what he was actually told, the following conclusion of the Order is 
clearly erroneous, "[t]hus, Bartlett clearly knew before that proceeding [change of plea] 
was over that there was a decision that had to be made at the end of the retained 
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jurisdiction and that probation did not automatically follow." Order, p. 5 (emphasis in 
the original.) Contrary to the conclusion in the Order, Mr. Bartlett was not advised in 
any way that any sort of decision that would be made by the presiding judge at a rider 
review hearing. In fact, he was not even advised that there would be a hearing, much 
less told that it was review or disposition hearing. Rather, he was simply told by the 
court he would "be brought back" from the rider, which could variously mean back to 
Boise or back to court. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument it was understood there would be a 
hearing, at no time in the change of plea hearing was he told that the presiding judge 
would be making any decision regarding whether he would be placed on probation or 
not. What he was told was if he was successful "they would then file a recommendation 
to the Court that you be brought back and placed on probation. And then you could get 
on with your life." 
This in no way clearly advises Mr. Bartlett that there was a decision to be made 
by the presiding judge at the end of the retained jurisdiction and that probation did not 
automatically follow. Rather, by skipping from the recommendation of probation to Mr. 
Bartlett getting on with his life without mentioning the intervening step where the 
presiding judge decides whether to place him on probation or not, the plan B judge 
clearly advises that probation does automatically follow a successful rider. 
While the Order tries to make much out of the use of the term recommendation, 
it must be remembered that this case is not about a judge's understanding of the 
retained jurisdiction program. Rather, this case is about what this defendant was told by 
the plan B judge which informed his understanding. In other words, since the plan B 
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judge skipped the step where the presiding judge makes a decision, there is nothing 
about the use of the term recommendation which would alert Mr. Bartlett that probation 
does not automatically follow a recommendation that he be placed on probation. 
Finally as to the change of plea hearing, the plan B judge inadvertently 
confirmed to Mr. Bartlett that a successful rider results in probation when it explained 
the partial expungment process. The plan B judge again skips the step where the 
presiding judge makes a decision or that Mr. Bartlett could serve a successful rider but 
not receive probation. The plan B judge stated that his record would show that "you 
went on a retained jurisdiction. And if you completed that successfully, then it would 
show you were placed on probation." 
To summarize, at the change of plea hearing, Mr. Bartlett was never told the 
presiding judge would be making the decision of whether he would be placed on 
probation or not, and was certainly not told of the possibility of him successfully 
completing the rider but nevertheless not being placed on probation. 
Nor was he told this at the sentencing. Rather, everything that Mr. Bartlett was 
told supported an understanding that if he that if he successfully completed his rider he 
would be placed on probation. The relevant exchanges follow. 
First, the prosecutor stated that when he comes back from the rider, the state 
will be asking for additional terms of the sentence. In response, Mr. Bartlett confirmed 
his understanding of the promise. 
No. I didn't understand the additional things that are going to be imposed 
on or asked for after the-when I get back from the rider. I thought it would 
be just probation right then. 
Tr. p. 9/27/2010, p. 18, In. 25-p. 19, In. 3 (emphasis added). 
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Significantly, no one disagreed with him and said it would not be just probation 
right then and instead, whether he is put on probation or not is up to the presiding judge. 
Nor was he told that he could successfully complete his rider but nevertheless not be 
placed on probation. 
Rather, the plan B judge said that I guess if the prosecutor wants to make some 
recommendation to the presiding judge it doesn't necessarily mean that she'll follow it. 
(Tr. p. 9/27/2010, p. 19, Ins. 4-6.) In immediate response, the prosecutor informed the 
court and the defense that some of the additional terms may include a no contact order, 
public defender reimbursement, and may be other statutorily permitted sentencing 
terms. (Tr. p. 9/27/2010, p. 19, Ins. 7-13.) However, relinquishment of jurisdiction 
and/or serving the prison sentence was never mentioned. 
The plan B judge then stated: 
THE COURT: Okay, and you understand like, even if your complete the 
retain jurisdiction program successfully and you are placed on probation, 
some of the terms of probation could be that you could be ordered to 
reimburse the District Court, reimburse the Public Defender, stuff like that, 
Okay? They will give you time to pay it. 
Tr. p. 9/27/2010, p. 19, Ins. 14-20 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Bartlett then took issue with the public defender reimbursement and 
complained that it had been waived before because he was poor and he cannot afford 
it. (Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 19, In. 21-p. 20, In. 3.) The plan B judge informed him that it's not 
waived this time, but whatever is imposed would be a condition of his probation and no 
one gets put in jail because they can't pay. (Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 20, Ins. 4-7.) 
So what happened is that Mr. Bartlett explained his understanding of the 
agreement, which was that he would just be put on probation when he came back from 
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his rider. In response, he was not told that the presiding judge would actually later be 
making the decision regarding whether he was placed on probation or not, but rather, 
he was told what some of the terms of that probation may be. Nothing about this would 
change his understanding that he would be placed on probation. At most, well into 
the sentencing, he may have understood that the presiding judge would be making 
decisions regarding the terms of the probation, but he was not told that she would be 
deciding whether he would be placed on probation or not. 
Mr. Bartlett obviously believed probation was a foregone conclusion (at least with 
a successful rider), and no one disabused him of this notion despite what should have 
been an obvious (to the state or court) opening. Had someone done so it would have 
been a point of contention and the subject of discussion, which is shown by the fact 
that Mr. Bartlett even complained about the mere possibility of public defender 
reimbursement which he did not think he should pay. So as in Buchanan where the 
prosecutor likewise did not object to a misstatement by the court, his understanding is 
informed not just by what he is told, but also by what he is not told when he asks a 
question to clarify. 
The next exchange occurred at the sentencing when the plan B judge formally 
imposed sentenced and stated Mr. Bartlett's credit for time served, explaining what it 
would be if, for example, he didn't make it on his rider: 
Let me explain it to you this way. Let's say you don't make it. 
DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: And they recommend you have to go serve your sentence. 
You would have to serve two years fixed before you are eligible for parole. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that. 
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Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 22, Ins. 5-11 (emphasis added). 
The plan B judge went on to explain that he would get credit for the time he 
served at Cottonwood in addition the time he had had already served in jail. 
After that, the plan B judge continued: 
Okay. So under Idaho law, after you served the two year fixed sentence, 
you'd be eligible for parole. And it would be up to the parole commission 
when you could be released. But in no event could they hold you any 
longer than the total of five years, see? You understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: That if I fouled up on the-
THE COURT: Right. 
THE DEFENDANT: But if I complete the program and everything goes 
good! I will be on probation? 
THE COURT: Right. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understand that. 
Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 23, Ins. 4-15 (emphasis added). 
Significantly, the Order never even attempts to explain away this exchange, other 
than incorrectly claiming it was just part of the pep talk. (Order, p. 5.) It was not, that 
came later, this was still a substantive discussion. 
Contrary to the conclusion of the Order, the plan B judge is clearly and 
unambiguously promising that probation follows a successful rider. First, the plan B 
judge explains to Mr. Bartlett what would happen if he doesn't make it on his rider, 
which is he will have to serve his sentence. Significantly, the plan B judge's wording 
again makes it look like the recommendation is binding with no intervening step where 
the presiding judge makes the decision; "And they recommend you have to go serve 
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your sentence. You would have to serve two years fixed before you are eligible for 
parole." 
Then, Mr. Bartlett confirms his understanding, that if he fouls up on his rider he 
serves his sentence, but if he completes the program and everything goes good he will 
be on probation, and the court agrees both times. He is again not told that he can 
make it or be successful on his rider but nevertheless not receive probation. In other 
words, he is only told that prison can be a consequence if he does not make it, not if he 
makes it. 
Finally, immediately after the above exchange, the court did give Mr. Bartlett a 
pep talk to encourage him to perform well on his rider. Significantly, this was the only 
time in the day's proceedings where Mr. Bartlett was told anything from which it could 
even be inferred that the presiding judge would later be able to make a decision about 
whether he would be placed on probation or not, and that would be if he violated a lot 
of rules on his rider: 
And so when you come back here, Judge Copsey is going to see every 
item you violated a rule. And if you violate a lot of rules up there, she's 
going to say to herself, I don't think he can do probation successfully 
because he violated all these rules up there, and he's not going to follow 
our rules of probation. See, that's how it works. 
THE DEFENANT: Weill am confident that I'll come back with a A-1 report. 
THE COURT: Okay. Hope you do. 
Tr. 9/27/2010, p. 24, In. 20-p. 25, In. 4. 
Of course, this does not necessarily mean the presiding judge can decline to put 
a wayward defendant on probation, one inference that is the presiding judge will 
impose a very strict or high supervision probation if a defendant violated a lot of rules. 
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But even assuming arguendo that a fair inference is the presiding judge could decline 
to put a defendant on probation if he violated a lot of rules, that also reinforces the 
inverse inference that a defendant would receive probation if he did not violate rules 
and had a successful rider. 
So given all the instances described above, the Order was just wrong when it 
held that the plan B judge's comments did not create an expectation of probation and he 
was not promised probation. Further, as in Buchanan, the state did not object to the 
court's statements which made it seem like probation would automatically follow a 
successful probation. Nor did it object to Mr. Bartlett's direct questions which confirmed 
this belief. 
This was not a defendant who asked no questions and only later claimed he did 
not understand something. Several times during the proceedings that day, Mr. Bartlett 
engaged the court with questions when he didn't understand something and was 
diligent in doing what he could to confirm his understanding. In short, if Mr. Bartlett is 
not allowed to rely on the answers to his questions (and the absence of correction), it 
begs the question of how a defendant is supposed to confirm his understanding. 
Mr. Bartlett's clarifying exchanges with the plan B judge also show why the 
Order is wrong in its repeated reliance on Mr. Bartlett's comments toward the end of 
CAPP rider which the Order claims demonstrates even he did not believe there was a 
promise. The C-note entry stated: "[h]e is concerned that no matter how hard he tries, 
his judge will not accept his program an extend him anyway." 
Actually, if the Order is simply stating what Mr. Bartlett's belief was on December 
14,2010, and not on September 27,2010, when he pled guilty, it is correct. Of course, 
29 
what he believed well after pleading guilty is beside the point, so presumably the Order 
is attempting to use the later comments to show his understanding months earlier. But 
they do not, that is shown by his questions and the plan B judge's comments and 
answers at the change of plea hearing and sentencing. While he was on his rider, Mr. 
Bartlett was no doubt disabused of the notion he would automatically be receiving 
probation, but his later correct understanding does not relate back to change his earlier 
understanding, nor is it even evidence of it. 
So just like in Buchannan, given the plan B judge's clear statements and answers 
to Mr. Bartlett's questions, his repeated assertion of his understanding, and the state's 
failure to object or correct that belief, he could have no reason other than to believe that 
the plan B judge's explanation of what would happen was correct. 
Second, the Order erroneously held that Mr. Bartlett did not serve a successful 
rider. The Order complains that the plan B judge did not define what a successful rider 
was. However, Appellant asserts that in the context of this case, where the question is 
whether Mr. Bartlett performed his side of the bargain he had with the plan B judge, it 
is disingenuous to claim that his completing all classes, having no formal or informal 
disciplinary sanctions, and receiving a recommendation of probation, was not a 
successful rider. 
Again, this case does not concern the normal operation of the retained 
jurisdiction program, and so it does not matter what a district court may normally do, 
such as relinquish jurisdiction despite a recommendation of probation. Rather, an 
objective standard of success applies to the unique context of our case, which involves 
the notion that litigants need to be able to trust what they are told by district judges. A 
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court's promise should not be able to be avoided by resort to a standard less 
subjective determination of performance where the defendant would have no reason to 
believe that something other than the common usage of "successfully completing" a 
program would be used.6 
Finally, the Order complained that because he was at a CAPP rider, Mr. Bartlett 
did not receive any treatment for his anger issues and documented violent behavior or 
mental health problems. While the presiding judge may well be able to take what 
treatment a defendant did not receive in deciding whether to place a defendant on 
probation in a normal case, Appellant asserts that she cannot for the purpose of 
determining whether or not Mr. Bartlett performed his side of the bargain in this case. 
He had no control over where he was sent, and as explained by defense counsel in the 
sentencing, he requested to go to Cottonwood but was turned down, and so did what 
was available to him. 
To summarize, regardless of whether the plan B judge should have made the 
promise of probation if Mr. Bartlett successfully completed his rider, the plan B judge did 
as shown by the colloquies above. Mr. Bartlett did what he could to confirm his 
understanding of the agreement and was never corrected. By any objective standard, 
he successfully completed his rider. 
6 While Appellant's point is that the rider should not be subjectively judged, it bears 
mentioning that while doing just that, the Order seems to just emphasis the bad things 
from the APSI about how the rider was difficult for Mr. Bartlett and ignored the good. 
In addition, the "significant unaddressed mental health issues" comment mentioned in 
the Order was simply based on CAPP's statement that "[h]e has stated he has ongoing 
depression that may need additional consideration during recovery. This type of 
treatment is not available at CAPP." PSI, p. 181. 
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The presiding judge erred by finding there was no promise by the plan B judge 
nor performance by Mr. Bartlett. Thus, the order relinquishing jurisdiction should be 
vacated, his sentence suspended, and Mr. Bartlett placed on probation. Additionally, 
given the already determined position of the "presiding judge regarding probation, upon 
remand, Appellant requests his case be assigned to a different district judge. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and remand his case to the district court to suspend his 
sentence nunc pro tunc to the time of the rider review and place him on probation, and 
in addition, assign his case to a. d)fferent district judge. ~.. . 7 ... 
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